Welcome to the COREY PEARSON- CIA SPYMASTER SERIES!

                                 Whether you’re looking for a quick, thrilling short-story read or an immersive spy novel to sink into, Corey Pearson’s world has something for every adventure lover. Buckle up, explore the world of espionage, and join Corey Pearson on his next mission today!   

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COREY PEARSON- CIA SPYMASTER NOVEL SERIES: Enter the deadly world of Corey Pearson – CIA Spymaster, where deception is survival and the enemy hides in plain sight in these full-length novels. In Mission of Vengeance, Pearson hunts Russian agents behind a Caribbean massacre. In Shadow War, he uncovers a sleeper cell plot threatening millions on U.S. soil. From covert ops to nuclear threats, these gripping thrillers fuse real spycraft with breakneck action. The line between ally and traitor blurs—and only Pearson’s team can stop the chaos before it’s too late.

COREY PEARSON- CIA SPYMASTER SHORT STORY SERIES: These quick, 20-30 minute reads are perfect for spy thriller enthusiasts who crave high-stakes missions packed with real-world espionage and gripping spycraft. Read them in any order and get whisked away into Corey Pearson’s daring adventures, all in a single sitting!

 

  

 

When Allies Spy: Inside the Quiet World of Friendly Espionage

 

Trust or Treason? The Real Story Behind Allied Spying on the U.S.

What if your closest ally rifled through your drawers while you stepped out for coffee? Everything looks untouched when you return, but something’s… off. That’s how espionage works between friendly nations — polished diplomacy by day, quiet surveillance by night.

     And it’s not rare. Even among the U.S. and its tightest allies, spying isn’t the exception — it’s part of the playbook. Everyone’s smiling in press photos, but behind closed doors, they’re quietly digging through each other’s digital closets.

     Germany? Caught in 2023 trying to intercept U.S. embassy signals in Europe. France? Allegedly sniffing around American drone tech via defense contractors. Israel? Long considered among the most aggressive friendly collectors. South Korea? Reportedly monitored U.S. discussions during nuclear talks with the North.

     This murky reality is the exact territory navigated in the Corey Pearson – CIA Spymaster Series. Corey, a seasoned CIA operations officer, runs point on U.S. intelligence strategy in this shifting landscape. He and his elite team understand the unspoken rules of allied espionage: everyone’s watching, but only some need to know what they’re seeing. That’s why Corey shares intelligence with foreign intel services only on a need-to-know basis — and even then, it’s carefully curated.

     A leak, a whisper, or a misstep can compromise more than just an op; it can upend diplomatic balance. In the series, Corey often walks the line between collaboration and containment, deciding when to trust an ally and when to play it close to the vest. It's not just spy fiction — it's a reflection of how real-world operatives manage the fragile alliances that keep national security intact.

     Is it really betrayal? Not quite. It’s more like covering your own backside. If you’re a foreign leader, you can’t afford to be blindsided by a sudden shift in U.S. policy that could mess with your economy, your re-election, or your national security. So, instead of waiting around for the official briefing — which might never come — you send someone to do a little quiet digging. Could be a cyber op, could be a well-placed source. Either way, you make sure you’re not the last to know.

     These days, that backdoor doesn’t always lead to a government agency — it leads straight into the private sector. The real weak spot in U.S. national security? It’s often a tech startup building the next-gen hypersonic engine or an AI company playing with stuff no one’s seen before. Most of them don’t even realize they’re on someone’s radar. And if they do? They quietly sweep it under the rug and keep moving. A headline about a breach is bad for business — worse than a few stolen secrets.

     These aren’t dramatic Cold War-style ops. No dead drops or double agents in parking garages. It’s malware, compromised cloud access, fake business contacts asking the right questions. Sometimes, a mid-level employee with just enough access and not enough caution is all it takes.

     So how does the U.S. respond when allies cross the line?

     Not with press conferences. Not with sanctions. But with silence — the kind that stings. Intel sharing gets reduced. Access to classified briefings tightens. Entire liaison channels may get rerouted. The message is clear: we noticed. You’re on probation.

     There’s rarely a public fallout. That would mean admitting how often this happens — and how often we’re doing it, too. Because yes, the U.S. spies on allies. Always has. Always will. The difference is, we’re usually better at it.

     Sometimes, recalibrating those internal boundaries happens fast. Other times, it takes years to rebuild trust. And often, that trust never fully returns. Agencies shift priorities. Personnel get reassigned. Systems get re-secured. You’d never know it unless you were in the room.

     If Corey Pearson — the fictional CIA spymaster — were real, he’d be the one coordinating that response. Not blowing it up. Just quietly moving the pieces. One less intel briefing here. One new surveillance op there. Not all threats wear enemy uniforms. Sometimes they arrive with credentials and a wine invitation.

     And that’s the strange truth about allied espionage: it doesn’t break the alliance. It lives inside it. Trust becomes conditional. Access becomes a privilege, not a given. Everyone smiles. Everyone shares. Everyone withholds.

     There’s a blurred line between cooperation and covert action — and it gets murkier by the year. In the world of Corey Pearson, that tension is the fuel: figuring out who’s loyal today, who’s lying tomorrow, and who’s simply doing what their country expects of them. It’s fiction that mirrors reality — because in this space, fiction doesn’t have to stretch that far.

     Next time you see allies standing shoulder to shoulder at a podium, remember: back in their situation rooms, they’re probably double-checking the locks on their own digital cabinets. Because when even your friends are watching you… who’s watching the watchers? 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

The Secret World of CIA Operatives: HUMINT, Spycraft, and Staying Undetected

 

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Still Drives CIA Operations

     You won’t spot them. Not the real ones.

     While the world obsesses over facial recognition, satellite surveillance, and AI, somewhere in a foreign capital—maybe Belgrade, maybe Bogotá—a CIA undercover operative is sipping tea at a corner café, eyes casually scanning the street for tails. No gadgets. No backup. Just instinct, patience, and a mind wired for threat detection. This is espionage in its purest form.  No special effects. No Bond gadgets. Just an operative walking alone through a war of shadows.

     Even with all the high-tech gear and digital wizardry out there, the CIA still puts its money on something surprisingly old-school: human intelligence. Or HUMINT, as the pros call it. It’s all about getting secrets straight from people — not satellites, not wiretaps. Just one person convincing another to give something up... whether it’s a secret, a cause, or their loyalty.

     Tech’s great at giving you the basics—who called who, where the call came from, what route a convoy took. But it can’t tell you the stuff that really matters. Like why that call was made. Or whether a general’s having second thoughts. Or if someone’s about to flip sides.

     That kind of insight doesn’t come from satellites—it comes from people. HUMINT might not be flashy, but when it comes to figuring out motives and reading between the lines, it’s still the gold standard. While analysts back home sift through pixels and data, CIA undercover operatives are out on the streets, watching faces, listening to tones, picking up on those tiny human tells no algorithm could ever catch.

     Recruiting a foreign asset isn’t done over a glass of scotch in a smoky bar with a slick one-liner. It’s a long game, sometimes stretching out for months or even years. Officers begin by spotting someone with access—then quietly assessing them, slowly peeling back the layers. What do they want? What do they need? Everyone is vulnerable to something, and the CIA’s methods for exploitation are still built around the same four levers: money, ideology, coercion, and ego. MICE, in spy-speak.

     Recruitment doesn’t go down in back alleys or smoky bars like the movies. Most of the time, it starts in totally normal places—a quick chat at a cultural event, a casual intro during a conference, maybe even small talk after a university lecture. The operative’s done their homework by then.  They’ve been watching, learning what makes the target tick, figuring out emotional pressure points. When the timing feels right, they go in with the pitch. But this isn’t just some sales job—it’s high-stakes. Say the wrong thing at the wrong time, in the wrong setting, and it’s not just a blown meeting. It’s game over.

     That’s what makes the Corey Pearson – CIA Spymaster Series so gripping. Corey once flipped a mid-level counterintelligence officer in Bucharest with nothing but a forged investment deal and a mutual disdain for his own agency. There were no gunfights or explosions—just pressure, persuasion, and precision. The scene played out exactly the way a real-life recruitment would: methodical, tense, and deeply personal. Because that’s how it happens in the real world.

     Getting an asset on board is just the beginning—the real work kicks off after that. Every single meeting has to be set up without anyone catching on, and every handoff has to be practiced and camouflaged to the point of invisibility.

     Dead drops? You’d never notice them unless you knew exactly what to look for. Some are hidden in rusted-out fence posts, others tucked behind a loose brick or screwed inside a hollow bolt on a park bench.

     Then there’s the brush pass—that quick, blink-and-you-miss-it move where two people collide on a crowded sidewalk, barely make eye contact, and just like that, a flash drive or note has quietly changed hands. But if that sounds slick, wait until you see an SDR in action—short for surveillance detection route. It’s basically a spy’s version of a stress test. You’re hopping subways, doubling back through alleyways, switching directions mid-stride, and disappearing into crowds, all while trying to flush out anyone who might be tailing you. Make it to the end clean? You’re clear. Still got company? You’ve got a serious problem—and your window to fix it is closing fast.

     Corey Pearson’s had to dance that line more than once, but one mission in Southeast Asia pushed him to the edge. A leak inside the host nation’s security service blew the lid off a CIA asset network Corey had spent years building under deep cover. No hesitation—he wiped everything. Burned his ID, erased every trace of his legend, and vanished before the knock at the door could come. It cost him everything: the cover, the mission, even pieces of who he was. But it saved lives. That’s the job. No parades, no medals—just gut-wrenching choices and the hope you never have to make them again.

     Despite satellites scanning the skies and code infecting enemy systems, the secrets that truly matter—the ones that shake governments, spark wars, or stop them—still pass hand to hand, face to face, in the back alleys and quiet corners of the world. And the operatives who survive? They don’t rely on gadgets. They rely on nerve, instinct, and the most dangerous skill in the CIA’s arsenal: knowing who to trust.

     Corey Pearson trusts no one until they’ve bled for the cause. And even then, he watches their eyes.

 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

Why the CIA Might Need to Go Undercover in American Defense Companies

 

Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Military Secrets from Inside Defense Plants 

     Espionage isn’t all tuxedos, shaken martinis, and rooftop chases. It’s much quieter than that—more clipboard than car chase. In the modern era of spycraft, the most dangerous operative doesn’t carry a silenced pistol — he carries a lunchbox and a tool belt. He wears steel-toe boots, clocks in on time, and knows everyone’s name in the breakroom. And maybe — just maybe — he isn’t there to fix HVAC units. Maybe he’s there to catch a mole.

     It’s a provocative idea: could the CIA embed operatives under deep cover inside U.S. defense plants, disguised as ordinary workers, to root out foreign spies who’ve slipped through the cracks? Or — if they’re not doing it already — should they be?

     That’s the kind of premise brought to life in the short-story thriller The Hunt For A Russian Spy, where CIA spymaster Corey Pearson disappears into a new identity to infiltrate Boeing’s defense division. Under the alias “Brian Carter,” a junior maintenance tech, Corey trades tactical briefings for blue-collar labor — sweeping floors, unclogging drains, and monitoring a Russian mole who’s dangerously close to stealing blueprints for America’s next-generation stealth surveillance aircraft.

     Nothing flashy. No spotlight. Just another guy fixing pipes and staying invisible. But that’s the whole point. Because in real-world spycraft, access without attention is everything.

     And while the idea of CIA agents working deep undercover on U.S. soil might sound like pure fiction, the real question is: how far from reality is it?

Officially, the CIA doesn’t operate like this. Legally, it can’t — at least not without serious oversight. The CIA is restricted by the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, which prohibit it from engaging in domestic law enforcement or surveillance on U.S. citizens.

     That job falls to the FBI, which leads counterintelligence efforts inside the U.S., particularly in high-risk sectors like defense, aerospace, and advanced technologies. The FBI, often in partnership with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), investigates suspected foreign moles, handles background checks for contractors, and oversees security protocols in companies that handle classified materials.

     So, on paper, there’s no mission patch for “Undercover Maintenance Guy – CIA.” But the real world isn’t always confined to paper.

     There are circumstances — highly sensitive, deeply classified circumstances — in which intelligence agencies work together across legal boundaries, particularly when foreign espionage is involved. If, for example, a suspected spy working inside a U.S. defense plant was believed to be actively collaborating with a hostile foreign government, the CIA could legally be brought into a joint operation. Especially if foreign nationals, overseas networks, or global assets are part of the picture.

     In those gray areas, the line between foreign and domestic threats blurs — and so does the line between which agencies are involved. That opens the door, at least speculatively, for scenarios like the one Corey Pearson finds himself in.

     To be clear, foreign spies are absolutely targeting U.S. defense companies. It’s not theory — it’s history.

     In 2016, a Boeing satellite engineer named Gregory Allen Justice was caught trying to sell sensitive military communications technology to someone he believed was a Russian agent. The agent was actually an FBI undercover operative. Justice claimed he was motivated by love for a sick woman he met online — a persona created by the FBI to reel him in.

     In 2018, Chinese intelligence officer Yanjun Xu was lured to Belgium, arrested, and extradited to the U.S. for trying to steal aviation secrets from GE. The case revealed years of espionage targeting America’s aerospace and defense contractors, using a mix of cyber infiltration and human assets.

     There are others — Kevin Patrick Mallory, a former U.S. intelligence officer who sold secrets to China. Jerry Chun Shing Lee, another ex-CIA officer who helped dismantle U.S. spy networks overseas. The list goes on.

     The espionage threat isn’t hypothetical. It’s operational. And in many of these cases, the spies weren’t breaking in — they were already inside. Employees. Engineers. Analysts. Insiders with access.

     Which begs the question: if the enemy is embedding human assets inside our defense contractors, should we be doing the same to fight back?

     The U.S. already runs undercover operations through the FBI — placing agents in universities, private companies, and even foreign government-linked firms to intercept espionage attempts. But FBI agents are law enforcement officers first. They’re investigators, not infiltrators. Their covers tend to be thin, short-term, and legally safe.

     What the CIA brings to the table is deeper.

     In The Hunt For A Russian Spy, Corey Pearson’s alias — “Brian Carter” — isn’t just a name. It’s a full legend: military service history, employment records, social security files, driver’s license, even an online presence and behavioral backstory. He carries himself like an Air Force mechanic because he was trained to. He uses the right slang, makes the right calluses, and walks the walk — all the way down to grease-stained hands and weekend fishing plans.

     That’s how CIA undercover work operates overseas. Could it — and should it — operate that way here?

     Imagine a CIA-trained asset embedded for months or even years inside a high-value defense facility. Not watching from a distance but observing up close. Not flipping targets, but quietly identifying them, mapping networks, and feeding intelligence to operational teams. The kind of long-game infiltration foreign services have used against us for decades.

     It’s not about kicking down doors. It’s about being invisible until you’re the only one who sees what’s really happening.

     The danger, of course, is legal overreach. The U.S. intelligence community was burned badly in the 1970s for domestic spying. Congressional reforms and oversight were put in place for good reason. The idea of turning the CIA inward, even in a targeted way, raises legitimate concerns about surveillance, civil liberties, and accountability.

     But national security has evolved. The battlefield is no longer just overseas — it’s embedded in our infrastructure, our tech labs, our defense plants. The adversaries aren’t always hackers or drones. Sometimes, they’re engineers. Sometimes, they’re janitors. Sometimes, they’re not who they say they are.

     If we want to catch spies, we may need to start thinking like them.

     That’s what makes The Hunt For A Russian Spy feel less like fiction and more like a preview. Pearson doesn’t save the world with explosions or exotic gadgets. He saves it by blending in, digging deep, and seeing what no one else can. He’s not pretending to be Brian Carter — he is Brian Carter. And in today’s threat environment, that kind of infiltration might not be just useful… it might be essential.

     So, could the CIA be placing operatives undercover in U.S. defense plants?

     Officially — no.

     Unofficially?

     You might want to take a second look at the guy fixing the water line in the restricted wing. He might not be here for the plumbing. 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

The Future of Five Eyes: Is U.S. Trust Breaking the World’s Top Spy Network?

 

America's Five Eyes allies are losing Faith in U.S. intelligence under Trump

Imagine a terror plot brewing, but it gets stopped cold before you ever hear a word about it. Not because someone got lucky—but because trusted allies had each other’s backs. That’s the kind of muscle behind the Five Eyes. It’s this low-key but insanely powerful intel-sharing squad made up of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. They swap secrets, track threats, and have each other’s six. And thanks to that, Americans have dodged danger more times than most people realize.

     Here’s just one example: In 2017, it was a tip from Australian intelligence—shared through Five Eyes—that helped thwart a planned terrorist bombing in an Etihad flight out of Sydney. That one piece of shared intel prevented a mass-casualty disaster. The point? This alliance saves lives. Real lives. And it does so because it’s built on a foundation of mutual trust, tight coordination, and years of shared risk.

     Which is exactly why what's happening now is so alarming.

     Under Donald Trump, that trust is wobbling. His open criticism of America’s closest allies, his coziness with Russia, and his reported concerns about intelligence leaks have spooked Five Eyes partners. Some have started quietly asking the hard question: Can we still trust Washington? If the answer shifts from “yes” to “maybe,” that’s a massive red flag.

     Five Eyes isn’t just some polite handshake between countries—it’s the brain and backbone of Western intelligence. It’s where the U.K.’s high-tech signals data links up with boots-on-the-ground info from the U.S., where Australia keeps tabs on Chinese warships, and where Canada or New Zealand can get into spots others can’t. Yank one piece out, and the whole setup starts to wobble.

     And now the cracks are starting to show. There’ve been real leaks—big ones. A “signal blunder” here, a security screw-up there. This isn’t just egg on someone’s face—it’s risky stuff. When allies start holding back their best intel or keeping key sources to themselves, the whole network takes a hit. The flow of information slows down. Early warnings get missed. Covert ops and spy networks get exposed. And you know who’s grinning from ear to ear when that happens? Russia. China. North Korea. Iran. 

     Even in fiction, this dynamic matters. In my Corey Pearson—CIA Spymaster Series, Corey and his elite team often depend on intelligence from Five Eyes partners. A CIA op in the Pacific might hinge on an Aussie satellite intercept. A British informant in Iran could save a mission in Lebanon. These storylines mirror real-world operations, where interdependence isn't a luxury—it's survival.

     What we’re seeing now could be the start of things coming apart. Europe and other allies are already looking at doing their own thing when it comes to intel—just in case. They’re nervous about what an unpredictable Washington might pull next. And the shakier the U.S. looks, the more those partners start playing it safe and keeping their distance.

     Here’s the raw truth: if the U.S. turns into the weak link, the Five Eyes could crack—and if that happens, we all lose. You can’t go it alone in 21^st-century espionage. Threats move too fast, and they don’t care about borders.

     Now, in theory, this mess could be fixed. Trust could be rebuilt. The U.S. could step up, calm nerves, and prove it still plays by the old rules—loyalty, respect, shared risk. But let’s be real: it doesn’t look like the Trump administration’s headed that way. If anything, the damage might already be setting in. And if that trust keeps slipping, there might not be any way to pull things back.

     Right now, the Five Eyes alliance is still holding together—but it’s feeling the heat. The other countries are watching the U.S. closely, wondering if they can still count on us. This isn’t just about collecting intel from allies—it’s about proving we’re trustworthy enough to deserve it. In the world of spying, trust is everything. And once you break it, no amount of tech, satellites, or spy gadgets can fix what’s lost. 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

The Truth About Obama’s Drone Program and Its Impact on al Qaeda

 

U.S. Drone Strikes Took Down al Qaeda’s Top Leaders

If you blinked, you might’ve missed it. While the headlines screamed about boots on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, a different kind of war was unfolding—one fought from the skies, without warning, without mercy, and often without official acknowledgment. It started under President George W. Bush, and by the time President Obama got his hands on the controls, the drone warfare program wasn’t just operational—it was a precision kill machine.

     The CIA and the Pentagon weren’t just watching from above. They were hunting.

     The Whispering Campaign That Became a Roar. Back in 2004, a whisper started echoing through the tribal regions of Pakistan—a whisper that carried the hum of a Predator drone. The CIA let it be known, subtly, that their eyes were everywhere. This wasn’t just warfare; it was psychological ops 101. Al Qaeda leaders started sleeping in different houses every night, paranoid about shadows in the sky. That whisper became a roar when, week after week, key operatives were taken out in pin-point strikes.

     Take the village of Datta Khel in North Waziristan—Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s stronghold. Despite a secret pact with Islamabad to not stir trouble for Pakistani forces, his compound was obliterated by a drone strike. The message? Deals with Pakistan didn’t buy you protection from the U.S.

     Under Bush, the drone program was cautious—maybe even experimental. But when Obama took over, he floored it. In his first term alone, drone strikes in Pakistan skyrocketed. Between 2009 and 2012, more than 260 strikes were recorded, taking out some of the most dangerous terrorists alive.

     The Kill List- No Longer a Myth. Forget hypotheticals. Here’s who got smoked:

• Abu Yahya al-Libi – al Qaeda’s #2, taken out in 2012.
• Baitullah Mehsud – Chief of the Pakistani Taliban, hit in 2009.
• Ilyas Kashmiri – Leader of al Qaeda's Lashkar al Zil, gone in 2011.
• Atiyah Abd al Rahman – Osama bin Laden's chief of staff, erased.
• The list keeps going: Abu Haris, Abu Jihad al Masri, Abdul Haq al Turkistani, Abu Khabab al Masri… all neutralized.

     These weren’t nobodies. These were high-level operatives with the means and intent to strike America again. The strikes didn’t just thin their ranks—they decapitated their leadership.

     The harsh truth? These precision kills prevented another 9/11.

     Enter Corey Pearson, CIA Spymaster. The real-world CIA isn’t the only place where drones played a deadly role. In the three spy thrillers in the Corey Pearson - CIA Spymaster Series, drone warfare isn’t just part of the plot—it’s a key weapon in the agency’s arsenal. In one operation, Predator drones are deployed to eliminate Russian Spetsnaz assassins threatening U.S. assets in the Caribbean. In another, drones silently orbit above a corrupt Russian oligarch’s mansion in the Dominican Republic, watching, recording, waiting to strike. These fictional missions mirror the real world’s razor-edge covert ops where you can step into the world of CIA black ops, where drones are more than tech—they’re tactical dominance.

     Pakistan: Ally or Enabler? Despite the high-value kills, Pakistan wasn’t cheering. In fact, they were fuming. Publicly, they condemned the strikes, calling them violations of sovereignty. Behind closed doors? A little murkier. Pakistan’s tribal areas had long been a sanctuary for terrorists, many of whom were never touched by Pakistani forces. That made U.S. drone action a necessary evil.

     As John Brennan, Obama’s counterterrorism chief, said in 2012: “We’re not going to relent until [terrorists] are brought to justice one way or the other.”

     And the drone strikes? That was the “one way.”

     Collateral Damage- The Controversy. Here’s where it gets uncomfortable. Civilian deaths did occur—no one denies that. Estimates vary, but by mid-2012, between 482 and 832 civilians may have been killed in Pakistan. That includes over 175 children. Even Obama acknowledged that civilian casualties were an issue, though he insisted the numbers were far lower than critics claimed.

     By 2012, however, precision had improved. Fewer civilians were dying. And HUMINT—human intelligence—was being integrated with electronic surveillance to reduce errors. Still, the outrage inside Pakistan was real. A 2012 PEW Survey showed 74% of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy. Drones didn’t just kill terrorists; they strained diplomacy to the breaking point.

     A Shadow War That Worked. Was it worth it? Depends who you ask. If you lost a loved one in a strike, your answer might be no. But if you measure success by results, the drone campaign dismantled al Qaeda’s leadership structure. It prevented mass-casualty attacks on U.S. soil. And it kept the fight overseas, instead of in American cities.

     Even amid controversy, the drone program stayed on course. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta put it bluntly: “We will continue to defend ourselves... This is about our sovereignty as well.”

     And in the fictional world of the Corey Pearson - CIA Spymaster Series, that doctrine lives on, showing how drone warfare fits into the bigger picture of American spycraft, power, and relentless pursuit of threats.

     The drone war might be a shadow war, but its impact is concrete. Al Qaeda’s leadership today is a ghost of what it was. And while critics keep asking if drones are moral, the enemies who plotted to burn America to the ground are, for the most part, already dust.

 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.

Massive Data Leak Exposes FBI, DHS, and DOJ Officials in Alarming Cyberattack

Personal Info of U.S. Federal Officials Leaked in Cybersecurity Crisis

 Cyberwarfare just got personal. This week, a hacker group calling itself “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” leaked the personal data of hundreds of federal officials across several major U.S. agencies—including the FBI, DHS, DOJ, and ICE. The leak was posted on Telegram, the encrypted messaging app that’s increasingly become the go-to platform for cybercriminals, extremists, and hacktivists. It included names, phone numbers, email addresses, and even home addresses—sensitive details organized neatly into spreadsheets, one for each department.

     This wasn’t a case of breaching some system for bragging rights. This was about targeting people. Cyberwarfare isn’t just about shutting down infrastructure or stealing classified files anymore. It’s about exposing the people who defend those systems, making them vulnerable where it hurts the most: in their personal lives.

     Experts are sounding alarms. The kind of information leaked in this breach opens the door to identity theft, doxxing, blackmail, and even threats of physical harm. A government badge doesn’t shield you from harassment or targeted attacks when your home address is out there for anyone to find. And it’s not hard to imagine how fast this kind of data can spread—or how dangerous it can become when combined with other digital breadcrumbs already floating around the internet.

     What makes this breach even more chilling is how calculated it was. These weren’t random files dumped online. The data was sorted and structured with purpose, like a roster for intimidation. It signals a shift in strategy. Rather than attacking institutions abstractly, hackers are zeroing in on the individuals who make those institutions work. This is psychological warfare—and it’s happening in the open.

     In my novel Shadow War, a fictional U.S. Senator—chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence—has his office computer hacked by Russian intelligence. They don’t go after top-secret files. They go after personal dirt. Leverage. It’s a spy thriller, but the lines between fiction and reality are blurring fast. This latest real-world breach plays out like a plot twist lifted straight from the book.

     What used to be the realm of nation-states and black ops has now become accessible to anyone with the right tools and bad intentions. Telegram and similar platforms have created an ecosystem where these kinds of leaks can thrive, shared instantly across borders and time zones. There’s no bureaucracy, no regulation, and very little accountability.

The implications of this leak are serious. Not just for the officials exposed, but for the broader understanding of national security. Agencies can spend millions hardening their networks, encrypting communications, and locking down systems. But it only takes one spreadsheet full of names and addresses to upend that work. Because you can’t firewall a home. You can’t encrypt a family member. You can’t patch human vulnerability the way you patch software.

This is the new face of cyberwarfare. Not just lines of code or bugs in the system, but real-world consequences for real people. And unless there’s a shift in how we think about protecting those people, these kinds of breaches won’t just continue—they’ll escalate. The battlefield has moved. It’s not inside some classified server room anymore. It’s in your inbox, your phone, your front porch.

 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.