Why the CIA Might Need to Go Undercover in American Defense Companies

 

Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Military Secrets from Inside Defense Plants 

     Espionage isn’t all tuxedos, shaken martinis, and rooftop chases. It’s much quieter than that—more clipboard than car chase. In the modern era of spycraft, the most dangerous operative doesn’t carry a silenced pistol — he carries a lunchbox and a tool belt. He wears steel-toe boots, clocks in on time, and knows everyone’s name in the breakroom. And maybe — just maybe — he isn’t there to fix HVAC units. Maybe he’s there to catch a mole.

     It’s a provocative idea: could the CIA embed operatives under deep cover inside U.S. defense plants, disguised as ordinary workers, to root out foreign spies who’ve slipped through the cracks? Or — if they’re not doing it already — should they be?

     That’s the kind of premise brought to life in the short-story thriller The Hunt For A Russian Spy, where CIA spymaster Corey Pearson disappears into a new identity to infiltrate Boeing’s defense division. Under the alias “Brian Carter,” a junior maintenance tech, Corey trades tactical briefings for blue-collar labor — sweeping floors, unclogging drains, and monitoring a Russian mole who’s dangerously close to stealing blueprints for America’s next-generation stealth surveillance aircraft.

     Nothing flashy. No spotlight. Just another guy fixing pipes and staying invisible. But that’s the whole point. Because in real-world spycraft, access without attention is everything.

     And while the idea of CIA agents working deep undercover on U.S. soil might sound like pure fiction, the real question is: how far from reality is it?

Officially, the CIA doesn’t operate like this. Legally, it can’t — at least not without serious oversight. The CIA is restricted by the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, which prohibit it from engaging in domestic law enforcement or surveillance on U.S. citizens.

     That job falls to the FBI, which leads counterintelligence efforts inside the U.S., particularly in high-risk sectors like defense, aerospace, and advanced technologies. The FBI, often in partnership with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA), investigates suspected foreign moles, handles background checks for contractors, and oversees security protocols in companies that handle classified materials.

     So, on paper, there’s no mission patch for “Undercover Maintenance Guy – CIA.” But the real world isn’t always confined to paper.

     There are circumstances — highly sensitive, deeply classified circumstances — in which intelligence agencies work together across legal boundaries, particularly when foreign espionage is involved. If, for example, a suspected spy working inside a U.S. defense plant was believed to be actively collaborating with a hostile foreign government, the CIA could legally be brought into a joint operation. Especially if foreign nationals, overseas networks, or global assets are part of the picture.

     In those gray areas, the line between foreign and domestic threats blurs — and so does the line between which agencies are involved. That opens the door, at least speculatively, for scenarios like the one Corey Pearson finds himself in.

     To be clear, foreign spies are absolutely targeting U.S. defense companies. It’s not theory — it’s history.

     In 2016, a Boeing satellite engineer named Gregory Allen Justice was caught trying to sell sensitive military communications technology to someone he believed was a Russian agent. The agent was actually an FBI undercover operative. Justice claimed he was motivated by love for a sick woman he met online — a persona created by the FBI to reel him in.

     In 2018, Chinese intelligence officer Yanjun Xu was lured to Belgium, arrested, and extradited to the U.S. for trying to steal aviation secrets from GE. The case revealed years of espionage targeting America’s aerospace and defense contractors, using a mix of cyber infiltration and human assets.

     There are others — Kevin Patrick Mallory, a former U.S. intelligence officer who sold secrets to China. Jerry Chun Shing Lee, another ex-CIA officer who helped dismantle U.S. spy networks overseas. The list goes on.

     The espionage threat isn’t hypothetical. It’s operational. And in many of these cases, the spies weren’t breaking in — they were already inside. Employees. Engineers. Analysts. Insiders with access.

     Which begs the question: if the enemy is embedding human assets inside our defense contractors, should we be doing the same to fight back?

     The U.S. already runs undercover operations through the FBI — placing agents in universities, private companies, and even foreign government-linked firms to intercept espionage attempts. But FBI agents are law enforcement officers first. They’re investigators, not infiltrators. Their covers tend to be thin, short-term, and legally safe.

     What the CIA brings to the table is deeper.

     In The Hunt For A Russian Spy, Corey Pearson’s alias — “Brian Carter” — isn’t just a name. It’s a full legend: military service history, employment records, social security files, driver’s license, even an online presence and behavioral backstory. He carries himself like an Air Force mechanic because he was trained to. He uses the right slang, makes the right calluses, and walks the walk — all the way down to grease-stained hands and weekend fishing plans.

     That’s how CIA undercover work operates overseas. Could it — and should it — operate that way here?

     Imagine a CIA-trained asset embedded for months or even years inside a high-value defense facility. Not watching from a distance but observing up close. Not flipping targets, but quietly identifying them, mapping networks, and feeding intelligence to operational teams. The kind of long-game infiltration foreign services have used against us for decades.

     It’s not about kicking down doors. It’s about being invisible until you’re the only one who sees what’s really happening.

     The danger, of course, is legal overreach. The U.S. intelligence community was burned badly in the 1970s for domestic spying. Congressional reforms and oversight were put in place for good reason. The idea of turning the CIA inward, even in a targeted way, raises legitimate concerns about surveillance, civil liberties, and accountability.

     But national security has evolved. The battlefield is no longer just overseas — it’s embedded in our infrastructure, our tech labs, our defense plants. The adversaries aren’t always hackers or drones. Sometimes, they’re engineers. Sometimes, they’re janitors. Sometimes, they’re not who they say they are.

     If we want to catch spies, we may need to start thinking like them.

     That’s what makes The Hunt For A Russian Spy feel less like fiction and more like a preview. Pearson doesn’t save the world with explosions or exotic gadgets. He saves it by blending in, digging deep, and seeing what no one else can. He’s not pretending to be Brian Carter — he is Brian Carter. And in today’s threat environment, that kind of infiltration might not be just useful… it might be essential.

     So, could the CIA be placing operatives undercover in U.S. defense plants?

     Officially — no.

     Unofficially?

     You might want to take a second look at the guy fixing the water line in the restricted wing. He might not be here for the plumbing. 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.