CIA case officers have always had to worry about a “Dangle”. Yeah, I
know, they are rewarded for recruiting foreign spies to become double agents,
and when one walks in the door and offers to become one, it is not easy to
resist. The “walk-in” may only be pretending to be interested in defecting or “turning”
to the CIA.
The
Soviets would sometimes send such “dangles” to the CIA—false informants with
bad intelligence. And it still may happen today. For years, CIA
counterintelligence officers feared Russian dangles to the point that they
thought the Moscow station could be compromised by them. So, they often turned
away Russian “walk-ins.” But after a comprehensive study, they realized that
many Soviets turned away for fear of being dangles were, in fact, legitimate!
The
CIA study of dangles revealed some interesting findings: there were patterns to
would-be volunteers. The KGB never sent their own officers. They simply didn’t
trust their people to be alone with CIA case officers. Also, they never used
people who were strangers to the CIA officer in question. The CIA learned that
the guy or gal one of them bumped into at a party may want to offer them
information. It was not a chance meeting, and the odds were much greater that he/she
was working in the service of the KGB. They “walk-in” that none of them ever
met or saw before was most likely not a threat, or dangle.
A Russian
dangle must convince the CIA interrogators that they have changed loyalties by
offering to be a double agent. If the ruse is successful, they begin feeding information
back to Russian intelligence while giving disinformation to the CIA.
The
KGB did a similar analysis of dangles and believed that most of them would not
come into a USSR government building with sensitive papers and would not
directly ask for money right away. Instead, they believed most “walk-ins” would
come in saying that they wanted to be a spy for ideological reasons to
prove their sincerity. I find this latter finding difficult to believe, since
Russian intelligence regularly recruits Americans to hand over sensitive
secrets via cash.
In
the MISSON OF VENGEANCE spy thriller, a former KGB agent living in the
Dominican Republic offered to defect and become a double agent. Here are a few
snippets that illustrate the CIA’s suspicion that he may be a dangle:
It
was a windowless, soundproof room in the basement of the U.S. Embassy in Santo
Domingo. The cream-colored walls were bare except for a small CCTV camera
attached near the ceiling and a one-way mirror beneath it. General Morrison,
Director of CBIF sat at a table with the embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission
Robert Harlow. His last assignment was with the U.S. Embassy in Bogota,
Colombia where he performed well in assisting Corey with the Penumbra Database
mission.
Corey entered the room, gently guiding a visionless man to a chair at
the table. He lifted the hood off his head and announced, “Gentlemen, meet Yuri
Bocharov.”
General Morrison spoke first. “Obviously, we’re not going to tell you
who we are or what we do. You enticed us to take you in and use you as a
double, but we cannot trust you… yet. For all we know, you could be a dangle.”
Corey sat down and poured himself a cup of coffee from the
stainless-steel thermos on the table. “Want some?”
Bocharov responded, “Yes, please.”
Corey
served him a hot cup. “You claim to know much of what is on the flash drive. We
intend to learn all you know in the next two hours before we release you. If
you’re a dangle, the info you give us would be bogus, meant to lead us astray.
Or, it might be accurate, but information that Russian intelligence is willing
to sacrifice to gain our trust, while you learn about our operation and pass it
on to them.”
Bocharov calmly sipped his coffee then replied. “I am three decades
older than you, Mr. Pearson. I’m a retired KGB agent who’s been in the business
of espionage far longer than you. I’m aware of the difficulties a walk-in like
me pose, but I assure you, I am not a dangle and have much incriminating things
to reveal.”
End of Snippet
This true video titled Spying in Russia: Decoding the Tradecraft is interesting, for
it shows a Russian spy recruited by a CIA Operative who was actually a Russian “dangle”.
Robert Morton is a member of the Association
of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), enjoys writing about the U.S.
Intelligence Community, and relishes traveling to the Florida Keys and Key
West, the Bahamas and Caribbean. He combines both passions in his Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster series. Check out his latest spy thriller: MISSION OF VENGEANCE.
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