Russian-Owned Company Supplied Defective Armor to U.S. Military—What It Means for National Security

 

Are U.S. Troops At Risk? The Shocking Truth About Russian-Made Military Armor

Most Americans assume that when a U.S. combat vehicle rolls onto a battlefield, every bolt, plate, and panel has been vetted six ways from Sunday. We picture tight security, background checks, layers of oversight.

     That’s why I was unsettled after reading “Russian Company Produced Defective Plates for U.S. Military” in The National Interest. The report described how Evraz North America, a subsidiary of a Russian steel giant, supplied armor plating to the U.S. Army and allegedly falsified quality control tests. What we don’t picture is a Russian-owned firm slipping defective armor into the military supply chain and signing off on paperwork that says everything passed inspection. And yet, that’s exactly what left me worrying.

     That’s not just embarrassing. It’s dangerous.

     Armor plating is not decorative. It’s the difference between a vehicle that shields soldiers from shrapnel and one that turns into a coffin when it takes a hit. If quality control tests are faked, then the numbers on a spreadsheet become a lie that rides into combat with our troops. And once that vehicle is deployed, there’s no recalling it like a bad batch of cereal.

     This is where national security stops being abstract and starts feeling personal. Our defense supply chain is supposed to be hardened against exactly this kind of vulnerability. Yet here we are, learning that a foreign-owned firm with ties back to a strategic adversary managed to get its product into U.S. military systems. That should set off alarms for anyone who assumes the front line begins overseas. Sometimes it begins in a factory, in a testing lab, or in a procurement office.

     If this sounds like fiction, it’s because it reads like it. In my short-story spy thriller The Hunt For A Russian Spy, which you can read in one sitting, Russian operatives infiltrate a Boeing defense plant to steal secrets of a next-generation U.S. spy plane. They don’t storm the gates. They blend in. They exploit routine. They target the weak seams in a massive, complex system. The suspense in that story comes from how ordinary the infiltration looks at first. A badge swipe. A routine delivery. A trusted contractor.

     Now look at what’s happening in real life. Instead of sneaking blueprints out the door, the infiltration moves in the opposite direction. Substandard materials slide into our military vehicles. Paperwork says “passed.” Boxes get checked. Shipments get approved. The damage isn’t dramatic at first. It’s quiet. Bureaucratic. Hidden inside supply contracts and certification forms. But the effect is the same. An adversary finds a way inside the system that builds and equips our military.

     That’s the uncomfortable parallel. In fiction, we expect foreign spies to be cunning. In reality, we sometimes assume our procurement process is immune to that kind of manipulation. It’s not. Modern defense systems rely on a global web of suppliers. Steel, electronics, software, microchips. Each link is a potential pressure point. If a hostile government can influence or control even a small piece of that chain, it gains leverage.

     And leverage can mean weakened armor, compromised components, or access to sensitive information. It can mean soldiers driving vehicles that are not as protected as they believe. It can mean adversaries learning where our standards are thin and pushing harder at those weak spots.

     This isn’t about paranoia. It’s about vigilance. National security isn’t only fought with aircraft carriers and missile systems. It’s defended in audits, inspections, and supply contracts. It depends on knowing exactly who is making the parts that protect our sons and daughters.

     When a foreign adversary’s footprint shows up in something as fundamental as armor plating, it’s a reminder that the battlefield has changed. The fight isn’t just out there. It’s in the supply chain. And if we don’t guard it as fiercely as we guard our borders, the next breach may not be fictional at all.

 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the full-length Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His thrillers reveal the shadowy world of covert missions and betrayal with striking realism.