Think allies don’t spy on each other? Think again.

 

Allies by day, spies by night in global shadows

People like to imagine alliances as clean, loyal arrangements. Friendly nations shake hands, sign treaties, and promise cooperation. But behind the smiles and official statements, another reality hums quietly in the background. Intelligence services, even among allies, keep watching each other. They always have.

     For years, Americans have heard complaints from European leaders about U.S. spying. The CIA and the National Security Agency, NSA, are often cast as villains in these stories, prying into the affairs of friendly governments. But the truth, as many intelligence veterans will tell you, is messier. In the shadow world of espionage, allies spy on each other all the time.

     One episode that shows how this quiet spy game works involves a German intelligence officer named Markus Reichel. He worked for Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, the BND. By most accounts, things weren’t going well for him there. During his treason trial, Reichel admitted he often felt sidelined and mistrusted by the people around him. That kind of situation can make someone vulnerable, and in the world of espionage a frustrated insider can look like a good recruiting opportunity.

     CIA case officers recruited him.

     Reichel eventually confessed to spying for the Americans. When asked why he did it, his explanation sounded almost personal. At the BND, he said, nobody trusted him with anything important. But the CIA? “It was different at the CIA,” he told the court.

     Stories like that tend to spark outrage in Europe. They fuel the narrative that Washington is snooping on its friends. Yet inside the intelligence world, none of this is surprising.

     Peter Earnst, a longtime CIA veteran who spent 36 years with the agency, often spoke openly about this reality. Twenty-five of those years were in the CIA’s clandestine service, the part of the agency that handles spies, covert meetings, and quiet operations. Later, he became the founding executive director of the International Spy Museum in Washington.

     Earnst had a simple explanation. Countries spy on allies because alliances don’t erase national interests.

     In his view, the practice goes back centuries. Even friendly governments want to know what others are really thinking, what deals they might be making, and what decisions they’re considering behind closed doors. Intelligence fills those gaps.

     Embassies, he liked to point out, play a double role in this system. Officially, they’re diplomatic outposts where countries exchange information. Unofficially, they are ideal listening posts. Intelligence officers often operate from embassy buildings under diplomatic cover, quietly gathering insights that never appear in official briefings.

     So when European leaders erupt over American spying, Earnst tended to shake his head. In his opinion, there was a touch of hypocrisy in the outrage.

      “They all spy on each other,” he would say, including on the United States.

     Still, some revelations have caused real diplomatic headaches. Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden exposed several U.S. surveillance efforts involving friendly governments. Among the most explosive claims was that the NSA had monitored the cellphone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The agency had also collected large amounts of phone metadata tied to communications in France and Spain.

     The leaks also suggested that American intelligence had listened in on parts of the Mexican government and hacked into the public email account of former Mexican president Felipe Calderón, along with a domain used by members of his cabinet.

     For intelligence professionals like Earnst, the bigger shock wasn’t the spying itself but the damage caused by the leaks.

     “It’s the leak that keeps on giving on damage,” he once said, reflecting on Snowden’s disclosures. After decades inside the intelligence community, he admitted he was relieved to be retired. “I’m glad I’m not in the intelligence community right now. It must be a nightmare.”

     Senior officials have occasionally acknowledged the obvious. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper once admitted that gathering intelligence on foreign leaders is “fundamentally a given.” Nations want to know what other leaders are planning, including friends.

     During a House Intelligence Committee hearing, Clapper was asked directly whether U.S. allies spy on American leaders as well.

     His answer was short and blunt.

     “Absolutely.”

     France, for example, has long collected intelligence on American politics and industry. Industrial espionage, aimed at giving domestic companies an edge, has been part of that effort. In the intelligence world, no country is entirely off limits.

     Well, almost none.

     There is one rare exception to this unwritten rule of friendly spying. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand operate under an intelligence-sharing arrangement known as the Five Eyes.  Born in the early years of the Cold War in 1946, the pact is essentially a gentlemen’s agreement: share intelligence freely and don’t spy on each other.

     Outside that circle, though, the rules are different.

     Allies cooperate, share secrets, and stand together in public. But in quiet rooms, behind embassy walls and encrypted networks, they’re also keeping a careful eye on one another. In the strange, patient world of intelligence, friendship rarely means blind trust.

 

Robert Morton is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) and writes about the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). He also writes the Corey Pearson- CIA Spymaster Series, which blends his knowledge of real-life intelligence operations with gripping fictional storytelling. His work offers readers an insider’s glimpse into the world of espionage, inspired by the complexities and high-stakes realities of the intelligence community.